CHINA’S PROPAGANDA IN SOCIAL MEDIA: COVERT INFLUENCE TOOLS
Keywords:
propaganda, China, online commentators, content farms, social media
Abstract
The article is focused on the tools of China’s propaganda in social media. Based on the analysis and systematization of Western scientific articles and reports of research organizations, China’s approach to the use of covert influence tools for shaping public opinion on the Internet is highlighted. It is found out that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses online commentators’ teams and content farms to spread party propaganda on social media. The ordinary citizens, in particular students, government employees and nationalistic Internet users, are engaged as online commentators. Their activities are controlled and coordinated by CCP organizations. The task of online commentators is to flood social networks with progovernment narratives, to guide discussion of political topics in accordance with CCP views as well as to counter criticism of Chinese government. In terms of content, the key topics are Hong Kong, Taiwan, the United States, as well as crisis events that could undermine the authority and reputation of Chinese government. The online commentators massively spread identical content in different formats through many obviously fake accounts. The activities of Chinese online commentators are also characterized by a low level of targeting, situational and short-term effects, minimal audience reach and engagement, etc. More successful are the activities of content farms that spread a mixture of political and entertainment content through intermediaries and on various online platforms and can influence certain target audiences at local level. Given the number of online commentators’ teams and expansion of propaganda networks, Chinese authorities are interested in further developing and improving covert influence capabilities to shape public opinion on social media.
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Nimmo, B., Gleicher, N., Franklin, M., Hundley, L., & Torrey, M. (2023, November). Adversarial Threat Report [in English]. [Adversarial Threat Report / B. Nimmo et al. November 2023. URL: https://transparency.meta.com/uk-ua/metasecurity/threat-reporting/ (дата звернення: 14.02.2025).]
Uren, T., Thomas, E., & Wallis, J. (2019). Tweeting through the Great Firewall. [in English]. [Uren T., Thomas E., Wallis J. Tweeting through the Great Firewall. 03 September 2019. URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/report/tweeting-through-great-firewall (дата звернення: 04.12.2024).]
Published
2025-04-22
Section
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES IN INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL CON
