RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION AND ISSUES OF SOLIDARITY AMONG DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST IT [PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM]
Keywords:
Russian disinformation, security, Ukraine, international relations
Abstract
This symposium is the result of work conducted since 2022 by the Odesa Centre for Disinformation Research (OCDS). OCDS aims to promote in particular the study of Russian disinformation globally with a geographical focus on disinformation strategies in the Black Sea region. While there are many scholars working on Russian disinformation globally this Centre provides greater collaboration and coordination internationally as well as contributes to knowledge concerning disinformation practices in a specific region. The OCDS involves associate institutional and individual associate members (academics and practitioners) based internationally. OCDS builds partnerships, enhances research capacity, provides support for research infrastructure, organises seminars and conferences, supports a network of scholars and practitioners, and seeds future research collaborations. The creation of OCDS was a joint initiative between IR Department of the Odesa I. I. Mechnikov National University (Ukraine) and the Centre for Research in Communication and Culture (CRCC) at Loughborough University (UK). Odesa I. I. Mechnikov National University and Loughborough University have collaborated on teaching and research activities since signing our twinning agreement in July 2022. In December 2022 ONU and Loughborough jointly organised a research roundtable discussing the impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine on political communication, journalism, and public opinion in a global context. The research roundtable was supported by the Fund of the President of Ukraine. The results of the discussion are being prepared for publication in the Symposia section in the journal “European Political Science”. Thus, we are now facing the second symposium organized by the OCDS. Director of OCDS Professor Dr Olga Brusylovska
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Published
2024-12-04
Section
SCIENTIFIC LIFE
