RUSSIAN DR. STRANGELOVE OR HOW MOSCOW NEVER STOPPED LOVING THE BOMB: RUSSIA’S APPROACH TO DETERRENCE

Abstract

The international security system has been in crisis for the past decade, with the most significant escalation occurring when Russia launched an armed aggression against Ukraine, a country that was guaranteed protection under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. This event led to a major shift in the role of nuclear weapons in global relations, triggering discussions about revising nuclear strategies and the use of nuclear deterrence as a policy tool. Russia has openly stated that traditional nuclear deterrence is no longer effective and has considered lowering the nuclear threshold to restore the credibility of its deterrence. This article aims to determine whether this potential shift in Russia’s nuclear strategy represents a move towards nuclear escalation or is merely an attempt to enhance its deterrence capabilities. The research is based on the theory of nuclear deterrence, focusing on the reliability, decisiveness, persuasiveness, and dynamics of deterrence. It examines Russia’s nuclear posture through the lens of its perception of deterrence, analyzing its military doctrines and strategies alongside the statements of Russian senior strategic representatives to gain insights into Moscow’s nuclear strategies and the stability of its deterrence. The study also explores the character of the Russian leader and their willingness to bear the risk of nuclear conflict, which directly influences the persuasiveness of Russia’s nuclear deterrence. Additionally, it delves into Russia’s “red lines” and the extent to which they reflect the true determination of the Russian leadership. In conclusion, the study suggests a decrease in the effectiveness of Russia’s nuclear deterrence, with attempts to restore it through the threat of using nuclear weapons if certain “red lines” are crossed.