РОСІЙСЬКИЙ ДР. СТРАНДЖЕЛАВ, АБО ЯК МОСКВА НЕ ПЕРЕСТАВАЛА ЛЮБИТИ БОМБУ: ПІДХІД РОСІЇ ДО СТРИМУВАННЯ
Ключові слова:
ядерна зброя, стримування, Росія, примус, «червоні лінії», стратегія
Анотація
Протягом останнього десятиліття міжнародна система безпеки переживала кризу, найбільше загострення якої відбулося, коли Росія почала збройну агресію проти України, країни, якій гарантувався захист згідно з Будапештським меморандумом 1994 р. Ця подія призвела до серйозних змін у ролі ядерної зброї у глобальних відносинах, викликаючи дискусії про перегляд ядерних стратегій і використання ядерного стримування як інструменту політики. Росія відкрито заявила, що традиційне ядерне стримування більше не є ефективним, і розглянула можливість зниження ядерного порогу, щоб відновити довіру до свого стримування. Ця стаття має на меті визначити, чи є ця потенційна зміна ядерної стратегії Росії рухом до ядерної ескалації чи просто спробою посилити її можливості стримування. Дослідження базується на теорії ядерного стримування, зосереджуючись на надійності, рішучості, переконливості та динаміці стримування. У статті розглядається ядерна позиція Росії через призму її сприйняття стримування, аналізуючи її військові доктрини та стратегії разом із заявами російських високопоставлених стратегічних представників, щоб отримати уявлення про ядерні стратегії Москви та стабільність її стримування. Дослідження також вивчає характер російського лідера та його готовність нести ризик ядерного конфлікту, що безпосередньо впливає на переконливість ядерного стримування Росії. Окрім того, аналізуються російські «червоні лінії» та те, наскільки вони відображають справжню рішучість російського керівництва. У висновках констатується певне зниження ефективності ядерного стримування Росії зі спробами відновити її через загрозу застосування ядерної зброї у разі перетину певних «червоних ліній».
Посилання
Adamsky, D. (2024). The Russian Way of Deterrence. Strategic Culture, Coercion and War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 226 p. [in English]. [Adamsky D. The Russian Way of Deterrence. Strategic Culture, Coercion and War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2024. 226 p.].
Baklitskiy, A. (2023, July 20). What We Learned From Recent Calls for a Russian Nuclear Attack. Carnegie Endowment. [in English]. [Baklitskiy A. What We Learned From Recent Calls for a Russian Nuclear Attack. Carnegie Endowment. 2023. 20 July. URL: https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/07/what-we-learned-from-recent-calls-for-a-russian-nuclear-attack?lang=en (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Bose, N. (2024, 7 October). Biden Cites Cuban Missile Crisis in Describing Putin’s Nuclear Threat. Reuters. [in English]. [Bose N. Biden Cites Cuban Missile Crisis in Describing Putin’s Nuclear Threat. Reuters. 2024. 7 October. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-cites-cuban-missile-crisis-describing-putinsnuclear-threat-2022-10-07/(дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Charap, S., & Priebe, M. (2023). Avoiding a Long War: U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. [in English]. [Charap S., Priebe M. Avoiding a Long War: U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2023. URL: https://doi.org/10.7249/PEA2510-1. (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Charap, S. (2020). Strategic Sderjivaniyee: Understanding Contemporary Russian Approaches to ‘Deterrence’. Security Insights. No 62. September. [in English]. [Charap S. Strategic Sderjivaniyee: Understanding Contemporary Russian Approaches to ‘Deterrence’. Security Insights. No 62. 2020. September].
CIA. (1963). Management and Termination of War with the Soviet Union: Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence. [in English]. [Management and Termination of War with the Soviet Union: Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence. CIA. 1963. URL: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R002900110001-0.pdf (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Cimbala, S. J., & Korb, L. J. (2023, August 21). Karaganov’s Case for Russian Nuclear Preemption: Responsible Strategizing or Dangerous Delusion? The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. [in English]. [Cimbala S. J., Korb L. J. Karaganov’s Case for Russian Nuclear Preemption: Responsible Strategizing or Dangerous Delusion? The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. 2023. 21 August. URL: https://thebulletin.org/2023/08/karaganovs-case-for-russian-nuclear-preemption-responsible-strategizing-or-dangerous-delusion/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Cimbala, S.J. (1998). Coercive Military Strategy. Texas A&M University Press. [in English]. [Cimbala S.J. Coercive Military Strategy. Texas A&M University Press, 1998. 240 p.].
Cole, B. (2024). Russia Threatens Nuclear Doctrine 'Amendments' amid Ukraine War. Newsweek. July 08 [in English]. [Cole B. Russia Threatens Nuclear Doctrine 'Amendments' amid Ukraine War. Newsweek. July 08. 2024. URL: https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ryabkov-putin-nuclear-doctrine-1921849 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Dickinson, P. (2021, July 15). Putin’s New Ukraine Essay Reveals Imperial Ambitions. Atlantic Council. [in English]. [Dickinson P. Putin’s New Ukraine Essay Reveals Imperial Ambitions. Atlantic Council. 2021. 15 July. URL: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-new-ukraine-essayreflects-imperial-ambitions/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Dickinson, P. (2024, August 21). Invasion? What invasion? Putin is downplaying Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. Atlantic Council. [in English]. [Dickinson P. Invasion? What invasion? Putin is downplaying Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. Atlantic Council. 2024. 21 August. URL: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/invasion-what-invasion-putin-is-downplaying-ukraines-kursk-offensive/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Faulconbridge, G. (2022, October 27). Putin Blasts West, Says World Faces Most Dangerous Decade Since WW2. Reuters. [in English]. [Faulconbridge G. Putin Blasts West, Says World Faces Most Dangerous Decade Since WW2. Reuters. 2022. 27 October. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-says-west-isplaying-dangerous-bloody-dirty-game-2022-10-27/(дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Freedman, L. (2018). Nuclear Deterrence. Ladybird Books Ltd. [in English]. [Freedman L. Nuclear Deterrence. Ladybird Books Ltd., 2018. 56 p.].
Gehrke, J. (2024, May 5). Russia Decries ‘Verbal Escalation’ of Western Leaders Backing Ukraine. Colorado Springs Gazette. [in English]. [Gehrke J. Russia Decries ‘Verbal Escalation’ of Western Leaders Backing Ukraine. Colorado Springs Gazette. 2024, 5 May. URL: https://gazette.com/news/wex/russia-decriesverbal-escalation-of-western-leaders-backing-ukraine/article_c61184f4-ddc1-55a0-9657-d1005e61c53d.html (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
George, A. L. (2003). The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries. Comparative Strategy. Vol. 22. P. 463–487 [in English]. [George A. L. The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries. Comparative Strategy. 2003. Vol. 22. P. 463–487. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930390256527 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
George, A. L., & Smoke, R. (1974). Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press. [in English]. [George A. L., Smoke R. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press. 1974. 666 p.].
Giles, K. (2023, 29 March). Russian Nuclear Intimidation: How Russia Uses Nuclear Threats to Shape Western Responses to Aggression. Chatham House Research Paper. Royal Institute of International Affairs. [in English]. [Giles K. Russian Nuclear Intimidation: How Russia Uses Nuclear Threats to Shape Western Responses to Aggression. Chatham House Research Paper. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 2023. 29 March. URL: https://doi.org/10.55317/9781784135645. (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Goetemueller, R. (2024, March 22). Ukraine and the Mind Games of Nuclear Deterrence. Financial Times. [in English]. [Goetemueller R. Ukraine and the Mind Games of Nuclear Deterrence. Financial Times. 2024. 22 March. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/b589f3d4-4ab1-4430-b2bb-d7c607473579 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Goetemueller, R. (2024, May 15). The Changing Nuclear Mind Game. Foreign Policy. [in English]. [Goetemueller R. The Changing Nuclear Mind Game. Foreign Policy. 2024b. 15 May. URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/15/nuclear-weapons-mind-game-deterrence-escalation-putin-russia-threatsukraine-war-biden/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Helmore, E. (2022, 25 September). Jake Sullivan: US Will Act ‘Decisively’ If Russia Uses Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine. The Guardian. [in English]. [Helmore E. Jake Sullivan: US Will Act ‘Decisively’ If Russia Uses Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine. The Guardian. 2022. 25 September. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/sep/25/us-russia-ukraine-war-nuclear-weapons-jake-sullivan (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Keating, J. (2024, August 28). Did Ukraine Just Call Putin’s Nuclear Bluff? Vox. [in English]. [Keating J. Did Ukraine Just Call Putin’s Nuclear Bluff? Vox. 2024. 28 August. URL: https://www.vox.com/politics/369035/kursk-nuclear-escalation-zelenskyy-putin (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Michta, A. A. (2023). Why Is the West Self-Deterring in Ukraine? Atlantic Council. 2023. [in English]. [Michta A. A. Why Is the West Self-Deterring in Ukraine? Atlantic Council. 2023. URL: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-is-the-west-self-deterring-in-ukraine/.(дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Morgan, F. E., et al. (2008). Dangerous Thresholds. Managing Escalation in the 21st Century. RAND Corporation [in English]. [Morgan F. E., Mueller K. P., Medeiros E. S., Pollpeter K. L., Cliff R. Dangerous Thresholds. Managing Escalation in the 21st Century. RAND Corporation. 2008. URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG614.html (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Morgan, P. M. (2003). Deterrence Now, Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 358 p. [in English]. [Morgan P. M. Deterrence Now, Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 358 p.].
Nakhoul, S., Faulconbridge, G., & Soldatkin, V. (2024, June 7). Putin Says Russia Does Not Need to Use Nuclear Weapons for Victory in Ukraine. Reuters. [in English]. [Nakhoul S., Faulconbridge G., Soldatkin V. Putin Says Russia Does Not Need to Use Nuclear Weapons for Victory in Ukraine. Reuters. 2024. 7 June. URL: https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/putin-calls-major-expansion-russian-financialmarkets-cutting-use-western-2024-06-07/#:~:text=Putin%20said%20he%20did%20not%20rule%20out%20changes%20to%20Russia's,so%20at%20the%20present%20time (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Oliker, O., & Baklitskiy, A. (2018, February 20). The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation’: a Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem. War on the Rocks. [in English]. [Oliker, O., & Baklitskiy, A. The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation’: a Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem. War on the Rocks. 2018. 20 February. URL: https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/nuclear-posturereview-russian-de-escalation-dangerous-solution-nonexistent-problem/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Putin, V. (2021, 12 July). On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. [in English]. [Putin V. On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. 2021. 12 July. URL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/tt382m/pdf (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Reuters. (2024, June 24). Russia is revising its nuclear doctrine, Kremlin says. [in English]. [Russia is revising its nuclear doctrine, Kremlin says. Reuters. 2024. 24 June. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-is-revising-its-nuclear-doctrine-kremlin-says-2024-06-24/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Rosenberg, S. (2024, 7 June). Confident Putin warns Europe is ‘defenceless’. BBC [in English]. [Rosenberg S. Confident Putin warns Europe is ‘defenceless’. BBC. 2024. 7 June. URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn00e422yr2o].
Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press. 320 p. [in English]. [Schelling T. C. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, 1966. 320 p.].
Schneider, M.B. (2018). Russian Nuclear «De-escalation» of Future War. Comparative Strategy. 37:5. 361–372. [in English]. [Schneider M. B. Russian Nuclear «De-escalation» of Future War. Comparative Strategy. 2018. Vol. 37. Is. 5. P. 361–372].
Sinovets, P. (2023a). All Blushes of Autumn: Russia’s Evolving “Red Lines” in the War on Ukraine. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo. No. 860 October. [in English]. [Sinovets P. All Blushes of Autumn: Russia’s Evolving «Red Lines» in the War on Ukraine. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo. No. 860 2023. October. URL:https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Pepm_860_Sinovets_October2023.pdf (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Sinovets, P. (2023b). Fifty Shades of Red: Where Does Russia Draw the Line? Outlook. War Series. No. 3. November. NATO Defence College [in English]. [Sinovets P. Fifty Shades of Red: Where Does Russia Draw the Line? Outlook. War Series. 2023. No. 3. November. NATO Defence College. URL: https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1897 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Sinovets, P., & Hesse, V. (2022). Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Evolution of the Escalation Strategy. Arms Control and Europe. / Ed. by P. Sinovets and W. Alberque. Contributions to International Relations: Springer International Publishing. 21–28 [in English]. [Sinovets P., Hesse V. Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Evolution of the Escalation Strategy. Arms Control and Europe. / Ed. by P. Sinovets & W. Alberque. Contributions to International Relations: Springer International Publishing, 2022. P. 21–28. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03891-4_3 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Sinovets, P. (2018). Escalation for De-Escalation? Hazy Nuclear-Weapon «Red Lines» Generate Russian Advantages. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 605. August. [in English]. [Sinovets P. Escalation for De-Escalation? Hazy Nuclear-Weapon «Red Lines» Generate Russian Advantages. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo. No. 605. 2018. August. URL: https://www.ponarseurasia.org/escalation-for-de-escalationhazy-nuclear-weapon-red-lines-generate-russian-advantages/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Sokov, N. (2024, August 24). The Battle of Kursk Probably Won’t Result in Nuclear Weapons Use Against Ukraine. But Russian Escalation Vis-À-Vis NATO Can’t Be Ruled Out. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. [in English]. [Sokov N. The Battle of Kursk Probably Won’t Result in Nuclear Weapons Use Against Ukraine. But Russian Escalation Vis-À-Vis NATO Can’t Be Ruled Out. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. 2024. 24 August. URL: https://thebulletin-org.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/thebulletin.org/2024/08/the-battleof-kursk-probably-wont-result-in-nuclear-weapons-use-against-ukraine-but-russian-escalation-vis-a-visnato-cant-be-ruled-out/amp/. (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Tertrais, B. (2016, 21 February). The Diplomacy of ‘Red Lines’. Recherches & Documents N°02/2016. Paris: The Foundation for Strategic Research. [in English]. [Tertrais B. “The Diplomacy of «Red Lines». Recherches & Documents N°02/2016. Paris: The Foundation for Strategic Research. 2016. 21 February. URL: https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/recherches-et-documents/diplomacy-red-lines-2016. (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
The Economic Times. (2024, June 20). Putin says Russia is considering changing its nuclear doctrine. [in English]. [Putin says Russia is considering changing its nuclear doctrine. The Economic Times. 2024. 20 June. URL: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/putin-says-russia-is-considering-changing-itsnuclear-doctrine/articleshow/111147065.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Ven Bruusgaard, K. (2016). Russian Strategic Deterrence. Survival. 58:4. 7–26 [in English]. [Ven Bruusgaard K. Russian Strategic Deterrence. Survival. 2016. Vol. 58. No. 4. P. 7–26. URL: doi:10.1080/00396338.2016.1207945 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Ven Bruusgaard, K. (2021). Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority. Journal of Strategic Studies. 44:1. 3–35 [in English]. [Ven Bruusgaard K. Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority. Journal of Strategic Studies. 2021. Vol. 44. Is. 1. P. 3–35. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1818070 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Baklitskiy, A. (2023, July 20). What We Learned From Recent Calls for a Russian Nuclear Attack. Carnegie Endowment. [in English]. [Baklitskiy A. What We Learned From Recent Calls for a Russian Nuclear Attack. Carnegie Endowment. 2023. 20 July. URL: https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/07/what-we-learned-from-recent-calls-for-a-russian-nuclear-attack?lang=en (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Bose, N. (2024, 7 October). Biden Cites Cuban Missile Crisis in Describing Putin’s Nuclear Threat. Reuters. [in English]. [Bose N. Biden Cites Cuban Missile Crisis in Describing Putin’s Nuclear Threat. Reuters. 2024. 7 October. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-cites-cuban-missile-crisis-describing-putinsnuclear-threat-2022-10-07/(дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Charap, S., & Priebe, M. (2023). Avoiding a Long War: U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. [in English]. [Charap S., Priebe M. Avoiding a Long War: U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2023. URL: https://doi.org/10.7249/PEA2510-1. (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Charap, S. (2020). Strategic Sderjivaniyee: Understanding Contemporary Russian Approaches to ‘Deterrence’. Security Insights. No 62. September. [in English]. [Charap S. Strategic Sderjivaniyee: Understanding Contemporary Russian Approaches to ‘Deterrence’. Security Insights. No 62. 2020. September].
CIA. (1963). Management and Termination of War with the Soviet Union: Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence. [in English]. [Management and Termination of War with the Soviet Union: Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence. CIA. 1963. URL: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R002900110001-0.pdf (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Cimbala, S. J., & Korb, L. J. (2023, August 21). Karaganov’s Case for Russian Nuclear Preemption: Responsible Strategizing or Dangerous Delusion? The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. [in English]. [Cimbala S. J., Korb L. J. Karaganov’s Case for Russian Nuclear Preemption: Responsible Strategizing or Dangerous Delusion? The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. 2023. 21 August. URL: https://thebulletin.org/2023/08/karaganovs-case-for-russian-nuclear-preemption-responsible-strategizing-or-dangerous-delusion/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Cimbala, S.J. (1998). Coercive Military Strategy. Texas A&M University Press. [in English]. [Cimbala S.J. Coercive Military Strategy. Texas A&M University Press, 1998. 240 p.].
Cole, B. (2024). Russia Threatens Nuclear Doctrine 'Amendments' amid Ukraine War. Newsweek. July 08 [in English]. [Cole B. Russia Threatens Nuclear Doctrine 'Amendments' amid Ukraine War. Newsweek. July 08. 2024. URL: https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ryabkov-putin-nuclear-doctrine-1921849 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Dickinson, P. (2021, July 15). Putin’s New Ukraine Essay Reveals Imperial Ambitions. Atlantic Council. [in English]. [Dickinson P. Putin’s New Ukraine Essay Reveals Imperial Ambitions. Atlantic Council. 2021. 15 July. URL: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-new-ukraine-essayreflects-imperial-ambitions/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Dickinson, P. (2024, August 21). Invasion? What invasion? Putin is downplaying Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. Atlantic Council. [in English]. [Dickinson P. Invasion? What invasion? Putin is downplaying Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. Atlantic Council. 2024. 21 August. URL: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/invasion-what-invasion-putin-is-downplaying-ukraines-kursk-offensive/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Faulconbridge, G. (2022, October 27). Putin Blasts West, Says World Faces Most Dangerous Decade Since WW2. Reuters. [in English]. [Faulconbridge G. Putin Blasts West, Says World Faces Most Dangerous Decade Since WW2. Reuters. 2022. 27 October. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-says-west-isplaying-dangerous-bloody-dirty-game-2022-10-27/(дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Freedman, L. (2018). Nuclear Deterrence. Ladybird Books Ltd. [in English]. [Freedman L. Nuclear Deterrence. Ladybird Books Ltd., 2018. 56 p.].
Gehrke, J. (2024, May 5). Russia Decries ‘Verbal Escalation’ of Western Leaders Backing Ukraine. Colorado Springs Gazette. [in English]. [Gehrke J. Russia Decries ‘Verbal Escalation’ of Western Leaders Backing Ukraine. Colorado Springs Gazette. 2024, 5 May. URL: https://gazette.com/news/wex/russia-decriesverbal-escalation-of-western-leaders-backing-ukraine/article_c61184f4-ddc1-55a0-9657-d1005e61c53d.html (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
George, A. L. (2003). The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries. Comparative Strategy. Vol. 22. P. 463–487 [in English]. [George A. L. The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries. Comparative Strategy. 2003. Vol. 22. P. 463–487. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930390256527 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
George, A. L., & Smoke, R. (1974). Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press. [in English]. [George A. L., Smoke R. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press. 1974. 666 p.].
Giles, K. (2023, 29 March). Russian Nuclear Intimidation: How Russia Uses Nuclear Threats to Shape Western Responses to Aggression. Chatham House Research Paper. Royal Institute of International Affairs. [in English]. [Giles K. Russian Nuclear Intimidation: How Russia Uses Nuclear Threats to Shape Western Responses to Aggression. Chatham House Research Paper. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 2023. 29 March. URL: https://doi.org/10.55317/9781784135645. (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Goetemueller, R. (2024, March 22). Ukraine and the Mind Games of Nuclear Deterrence. Financial Times. [in English]. [Goetemueller R. Ukraine and the Mind Games of Nuclear Deterrence. Financial Times. 2024. 22 March. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/b589f3d4-4ab1-4430-b2bb-d7c607473579 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Goetemueller, R. (2024, May 15). The Changing Nuclear Mind Game. Foreign Policy. [in English]. [Goetemueller R. The Changing Nuclear Mind Game. Foreign Policy. 2024b. 15 May. URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/15/nuclear-weapons-mind-game-deterrence-escalation-putin-russia-threatsukraine-war-biden/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Helmore, E. (2022, 25 September). Jake Sullivan: US Will Act ‘Decisively’ If Russia Uses Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine. The Guardian. [in English]. [Helmore E. Jake Sullivan: US Will Act ‘Decisively’ If Russia Uses Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine. The Guardian. 2022. 25 September. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/sep/25/us-russia-ukraine-war-nuclear-weapons-jake-sullivan (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Keating, J. (2024, August 28). Did Ukraine Just Call Putin’s Nuclear Bluff? Vox. [in English]. [Keating J. Did Ukraine Just Call Putin’s Nuclear Bluff? Vox. 2024. 28 August. URL: https://www.vox.com/politics/369035/kursk-nuclear-escalation-zelenskyy-putin (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Michta, A. A. (2023). Why Is the West Self-Deterring in Ukraine? Atlantic Council. 2023. [in English]. [Michta A. A. Why Is the West Self-Deterring in Ukraine? Atlantic Council. 2023. URL: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-is-the-west-self-deterring-in-ukraine/.(дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Morgan, F. E., et al. (2008). Dangerous Thresholds. Managing Escalation in the 21st Century. RAND Corporation [in English]. [Morgan F. E., Mueller K. P., Medeiros E. S., Pollpeter K. L., Cliff R. Dangerous Thresholds. Managing Escalation in the 21st Century. RAND Corporation. 2008. URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG614.html (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Morgan, P. M. (2003). Deterrence Now, Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 358 p. [in English]. [Morgan P. M. Deterrence Now, Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 358 p.].
Nakhoul, S., Faulconbridge, G., & Soldatkin, V. (2024, June 7). Putin Says Russia Does Not Need to Use Nuclear Weapons for Victory in Ukraine. Reuters. [in English]. [Nakhoul S., Faulconbridge G., Soldatkin V. Putin Says Russia Does Not Need to Use Nuclear Weapons for Victory in Ukraine. Reuters. 2024. 7 June. URL: https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/putin-calls-major-expansion-russian-financialmarkets-cutting-use-western-2024-06-07/#:~:text=Putin%20said%20he%20did%20not%20rule%20out%20changes%20to%20Russia's,so%20at%20the%20present%20time (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Oliker, O., & Baklitskiy, A. (2018, February 20). The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation’: a Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem. War on the Rocks. [in English]. [Oliker, O., & Baklitskiy, A. The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation’: a Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem. War on the Rocks. 2018. 20 February. URL: https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/nuclear-posturereview-russian-de-escalation-dangerous-solution-nonexistent-problem/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Putin, V. (2021, 12 July). On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. [in English]. [Putin V. On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. 2021. 12 July. URL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/tt382m/pdf (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Reuters. (2024, June 24). Russia is revising its nuclear doctrine, Kremlin says. [in English]. [Russia is revising its nuclear doctrine, Kremlin says. Reuters. 2024. 24 June. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-is-revising-its-nuclear-doctrine-kremlin-says-2024-06-24/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Rosenberg, S. (2024, 7 June). Confident Putin warns Europe is ‘defenceless’. BBC [in English]. [Rosenberg S. Confident Putin warns Europe is ‘defenceless’. BBC. 2024. 7 June. URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn00e422yr2o].
Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press. 320 p. [in English]. [Schelling T. C. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, 1966. 320 p.].
Schneider, M.B. (2018). Russian Nuclear «De-escalation» of Future War. Comparative Strategy. 37:5. 361–372. [in English]. [Schneider M. B. Russian Nuclear «De-escalation» of Future War. Comparative Strategy. 2018. Vol. 37. Is. 5. P. 361–372].
Sinovets, P. (2023a). All Blushes of Autumn: Russia’s Evolving “Red Lines” in the War on Ukraine. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo. No. 860 October. [in English]. [Sinovets P. All Blushes of Autumn: Russia’s Evolving «Red Lines» in the War on Ukraine. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo. No. 860 2023. October. URL:https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Pepm_860_Sinovets_October2023.pdf (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Sinovets, P. (2023b). Fifty Shades of Red: Where Does Russia Draw the Line? Outlook. War Series. No. 3. November. NATO Defence College [in English]. [Sinovets P. Fifty Shades of Red: Where Does Russia Draw the Line? Outlook. War Series. 2023. No. 3. November. NATO Defence College. URL: https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1897 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Sinovets, P., & Hesse, V. (2022). Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Evolution of the Escalation Strategy. Arms Control and Europe. / Ed. by P. Sinovets and W. Alberque. Contributions to International Relations: Springer International Publishing. 21–28 [in English]. [Sinovets P., Hesse V. Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Evolution of the Escalation Strategy. Arms Control and Europe. / Ed. by P. Sinovets & W. Alberque. Contributions to International Relations: Springer International Publishing, 2022. P. 21–28. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03891-4_3 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Sinovets, P. (2018). Escalation for De-Escalation? Hazy Nuclear-Weapon «Red Lines» Generate Russian Advantages. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 605. August. [in English]. [Sinovets P. Escalation for De-Escalation? Hazy Nuclear-Weapon «Red Lines» Generate Russian Advantages. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo. No. 605. 2018. August. URL: https://www.ponarseurasia.org/escalation-for-de-escalationhazy-nuclear-weapon-red-lines-generate-russian-advantages/ (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Sokov, N. (2024, August 24). The Battle of Kursk Probably Won’t Result in Nuclear Weapons Use Against Ukraine. But Russian Escalation Vis-À-Vis NATO Can’t Be Ruled Out. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. [in English]. [Sokov N. The Battle of Kursk Probably Won’t Result in Nuclear Weapons Use Against Ukraine. But Russian Escalation Vis-À-Vis NATO Can’t Be Ruled Out. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. 2024. 24 August. URL: https://thebulletin-org.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/thebulletin.org/2024/08/the-battleof-kursk-probably-wont-result-in-nuclear-weapons-use-against-ukraine-but-russian-escalation-vis-a-visnato-cant-be-ruled-out/amp/. (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Tertrais, B. (2016, 21 February). The Diplomacy of ‘Red Lines’. Recherches & Documents N°02/2016. Paris: The Foundation for Strategic Research. [in English]. [Tertrais B. “The Diplomacy of «Red Lines». Recherches & Documents N°02/2016. Paris: The Foundation for Strategic Research. 2016. 21 February. URL: https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/recherches-et-documents/diplomacy-red-lines-2016. (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
The Economic Times. (2024, June 20). Putin says Russia is considering changing its nuclear doctrine. [in English]. [Putin says Russia is considering changing its nuclear doctrine. The Economic Times. 2024. 20 June. URL: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/putin-says-russia-is-considering-changing-itsnuclear-doctrine/articleshow/111147065.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Ven Bruusgaard, K. (2016). Russian Strategic Deterrence. Survival. 58:4. 7–26 [in English]. [Ven Bruusgaard K. Russian Strategic Deterrence. Survival. 2016. Vol. 58. No. 4. P. 7–26. URL: doi:10.1080/00396338.2016.1207945 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Ven Bruusgaard, K. (2021). Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority. Journal of Strategic Studies. 44:1. 3–35 [in English]. [Ven Bruusgaard K. Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority. Journal of Strategic Studies. 2021. Vol. 44. Is. 1. P. 3–35. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1818070 (дата звернення: 03.09.2024)].
Опубліковано
2024-12-04
Розділ
МІЖНАРОДНИЙ ВИМІР ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЙНИХ ПРОЦЕСІВ
